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1 Introduction
The global financial crisis that erupted in 2007 in the U.S. has highlighted
the importance of aggregate balance sheet conditions of banks for economic
cycles. As a response to the crisis, policymakers have emphasised the im-
portance of macroprudential regulation, as opposed to and in addition of
reforms to the regulation and supervision of individual institutions (see, for
example, the policy reports by the Bank of England (2009) and the Bank of
International Settlements (2011)).
The main contribution of this research paper is to solve for the Ramsey-
optimal mix of monetary and macroprudential policies in response to various
economic and financial disturbances, and to analyse the welfare effects of
jointly setting these policies. I find that the first-best optimal outcome can
be replicated when a social planner can jointly use both a monetary and a
macroprudential instrument. On the contrary, using only monetary policy
leads to a policy trade-off between stabilising inflation and output gap. I
also compare the performance of rule-based policies to the Ramsey-optimal
policies.
Macroprudential policy refers to policy measures that aim at mitigating the
risks and imbalances of the financial system as a whole, while conventional
microprudential banking regulation has focused on single institutions. The
mitigation of credit cycles, which tend to be much more volatile than real
output cycles, has been seen as a key policy goal for the new macroprudential
framework. This regulatory response stems from the widespread view that a
build-up of system-wide risks and imbalances was at the heart of the collapse
of the financial system in 2007. In this view, mitigating credit cycles and
supporting financial stability are important policy goals in themselves, but
also essential for the stability of the economy as a whole, as banking crises
tend to have long-lasting consequences for real economic activity.
Suggested new macroprudential policy tools include, among others, counter-
cyclical and risk-weighted capital buffers for banks, that depend not only
on the banks’ own balance sheet conditions, but on aggregate credit and
other economic conditions. This new policy framework was internationally
adopted in the Basel III agreement in 2010 (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision 2010).
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As the crisis unfolded, many banks both in the U.S. and in Europe were
bailed out or recapitalised by governments. In the Euro Area, a new regula-
tory framework (the “banking union”) was set up. It includes both common
supervision of individual financial institutions, as well as a common bank res-
olution mechanism, which entered into force in 2014. This Single Resolution
Mechanism will be funded by contributions from the financial institutions
themselves, in proportion to the size of their balance sheet, with the pur-
pose of minimising the costs of future bank failures on the real economy (see
European Commission 2012).
In this paper, I analyse the interaction of interest-rate-based monetary policy
with macroprudential regulation in the stabilisation of economic cycles. I
formulate a DSGE model where the banks’ balance sheets play a key role in
financial intermediation, which in turn has an important effect on economic
cycles. These dynamics arise because of informational frictions in credit
intermediation caused by a particular agency problem, as formulated by
Holmström and Tirole (1997).
The key transmission channel from the financial sector to the real economy
is the real capital price, which on the one side affects invesment decisions
in the financial market, and on the other side household’s saving behaviour.
The fluctuations of this price summarise the effects that the agency cost has
on the availability of capital and investments in the economy.
In the Ramsey policy problem I formulate, a social planner has either one
policy variable (the inflation rate), or two policy variables (the inflation rate
and the level of investments) that he can directly set. The problem of the
planner is constrained in the sense that he cannot remove the agency costs in
the economy. The planner’s objective is to maximise the household’s lifetime
welfare.
The main contribution of this paper is the justification for a separate macro-
prudential policy, which the solution to the Ramsey problem provides. With
two policy variables, the planner can replicate the first-best outcome, which
is the flexible price real business cycle (RBC) equilibrium. There are no
policy trade-offs.
With only one policy variable however, the planner cannot replicate the
RBC outcome, leading to an inefficient optimum. There is in this case a
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policy trade-off in stabilising inflation, on the one hand, and stabilising the
output gap, on the other hand. This result highlights the importance of
having separate policy tools to deal with separate frictions - here, the nominal
friction on the one hand, and the financial friction on the other. Using only
conventional monetary policy that targets the inflation rate is not enough to
deal with both the nominal friction and the financial friction simultaneously.
The result is also in contrast with the traditional New Keynesian optimal
policy literature, where controlling the inflation rate is enough for the planner
to replicate the first-best.
Next, I compare the constrained optimum to a set of simple rule-based poli-
cies, which are more realistically implementable. I first look at an augmented
Taylor rule, where the monetary authority also reacts to financial develop-
ments through real asset prices. Then, I analyse conventional Taylor rule
policies together with a separate macroprudential tool. One such tool is a
cyclical leverage tax/subsidy on banks that aims at smoothing out credit cy-
cles; another is a cyclical tax/subsidy scheme on investment project returns,
which stimulates financial investment in recessions. These tax plans aim at
approximating the Ramsey-optimal policies in a more easily implementable
way.
I find that there are clear benefits from a separate macroprudential policy
tool in stabilising the effects of financial disturbances. By controlling the
aggregate leverage of the banking sector and smoothing out the credit cycle,
the macroprudential policy can effectively prevent the financial shock from
propagating to the real economy. In such a case, both the leverage tax and
the investment tax turn out to work exactly in the same way.
In contrast, when the disturbances arise from real supply or demand side
shocks and not from the financial sector, the form of the macroprudential
policy matters, as it can hinder proper economic adjustment by creating
an additional friction on the adjustment of investments. Here, taxing in-
vestment returns leads to better results (in terms of welfare costs to the
households) than a bank leverage tax. A unified mandate for the mone-
tary authority, where besides price developments the central bank also pays
attention to financial developments, can be beneficial.
Most theoretical macroeconomic models that deal with policy issues do not
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take the capital position of the financial sector into account, even though
there is ample empirical evidence of bank capital affecting economic activity.
Even many of the recent dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models of financial frictions abstract from banks’ balance sheets. Examples of
such studies include Iacoviello (2005), Monacelli (2006), Faia and Monacelli
(2007), and Adrian and Shin (2010). All of these articles consider shocks
to asset prices and the net worth of the borrower. However, none of them
discuss or analyse an explicit financial sector; instead, lending is done directly
between lender and borrower without intermediation.
Some more recent research do consider the role of credit intermediation in
business cycles. Many of them concentrate on “unconventional” monetary
policy tools, in contrast to conventional interest rate policies, such as ex-
panding the balance sheet of the monetary authority (quantitative easing)
or direct lending to the private sector by the central bank. Cúrdia and
Woodford (2010a, b, 2011) model balance sheets of both the central bank
and private banks in a framework of costly financial intermediation. Their
results suggest that in a deep enough financial crisis, such unconventional
monetary policy measures can be efficient.
Canzoneri et al. (2011) suggest, building on Cúrdia and Woodford (2010a,
b, 2011), that financial market frictions can be strongly countercyclical and
have amplification effects on business cycles and fiscal multipliers. This
finding supports the view that mitigating credit cycles has important conse-
quences for general economic conditions.
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) also study uncon-
ventional monetary policies and find that direct lending by the central bank
is an efficient monetary policy tool in mitigating financial turmoil. Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010, 2013) extend the model of Gertler and Karadi (2011)
to include interbank credit markets. In these models, the moral hazard is
generally between the bank and its depositors, affecting the supply side of
credit intermediation.
Another strand of literature uses the Holmström–Tirole (1997) double moral
hazard framework to explicitly model frictions on both the demand and the
supply side of credit intermediation. This approach to modelling agency
costs has been used by Chen (2001), Meh and Moran (2010), Christensen
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et al. (2011), and Faia (2010), and most recently by Haavio et al. (2015), on
which the present paper builds.
It is not evident how monetary policy should react to financial imbalances
– if at all – and how the new macroprudential policy measures should be
coordinated with monetary policy over the business cycle. As an example,
in an economic upturn, the monetary authority typically wishes to raise
interest rates. This will on the one hand increase banks’ cost of lending,
reining in credit intermediation. On the other hand, high interest rates
could have adverse incentive effects. According to the Tinbergen principle,
a policymaker should have as many policy instruments as there are policy
objectives, and each instrument should be assigned to one objective. In
light of this view, then, a separate macroprudential tool could be useful if
stabilising credit cycles is an objective of the policymaker. The Ramsey-
optimal policy analysis in this paper supports this view.
The literature on jointly optimising monetary and macroprudential policies
is not large. Most authors only look at rule-based policies. Angelini et al.
(2014) look at an economy with collateral constraints, where a policymaker
sets the parameters simple monetary and macroprudential policy rules to
maximise an ad-hoc quadratic policy objective. Angeloni and Faia (2013)
study jointly optimal rule-based monetary policies and capital regulation
using a model of bank runs. Christensen et al. (2011) investigate optimal
rule-based capital ratio regulation and monetary policy. With regard to
jointly optimal Ramsey policies, Collard et al. (2012) study jointly optimal
monetary and macroprudential policies in a model setting where limited
liability and deposit insurance cause excess risk-taking in the financial sector.
The closest work to the present paper is Christensen et al. (2011). The
findings in the present paper are mostly in line with theirs and those of
Angelini et al. (2014), who also find modest gains from macroprudential
regulation when shocks arise from the supply side, and larger benefits when
shocks arise from the financial sector itself. Unlike others, I provide a clear
justification for the need and the desirability of a macroprudential policy
through the Ramsey policy analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. First, Section 2 outlines
the theoretical framework. Next, Section 3 presents the calibration and
discusses the empirical fit of the model. The main contribution of this paper
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is presented in Section 4, which discusses the implications of the frictions
in the financial sector to the aggregate economy and the Ramsey-optimal
policy plans that can offset the effects of this friction to restore the first-
best. Next, Section 5 analyses the aggregate dynamics of the model economy
under various simple policy rules and compares these policy regimes to the
Ramsey policies. Section 6 discusses the welfare implications of the different
policy regimes. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
The model presented in this section builds on the recent work by Haavio,
Ripatti, and Takalo (2015). It incorporates into an otherwise fairly standard
New Keynesian setup a financial sector aﬄicted by double moral hazard of
the Holmström and Tirole (1997) type, whereby a moral hazard problem
exists both between the bank and its depositors, and the bank and its bor-
rowers. This allows for a friction to exist both on the supply and the demand
side of credit.
2.1 Structure of the economy
The economy consists of atomistic households, a production sector, a finan-
cial sector, and a government. The total mass of households is one. Each
household has three members with distinct roles: an entrepreneur, a banker,
and a worker-consumer1. Each banker manages a bank, each entrepreneur
undertakes risky projects to produce new capital goods, and each worker sup-
plies labour to firms, consumes final goods, and saves. Intertemporal savings
can be invested in riskless government bonds or in productive capital. There
is perfect insurance between the family members within a household, so that
the model can be described with a representative household.
The production sector is standard to New Keynesian models, except for
capital production. There are intermediate good firms and final good firms.
Monopolistically competitive intermediate good firms employ capital and
1The terms “worker-consumer”, “worker” and “depositor” will be used interchangeably
to denote the family member who is not an entrepreneur or a banker, depending on the
specific context.
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labour to produce goods, which are then bundled into final goods by perfectly
competitive final good firms.
Capital is produced by entrepreneurs, who undertake risky projects to do
so. The financial sector takes deposits from households, and issues loans to
entrepreneurs, who need funding for their projects. The banks also monitor
the entrepreneurs’ projects to guarantee efficient use of the funds.
The government issues riskless nominal bonds and conducts monetary and
macroprudential policy.
2.2 Households
In each period, part of the economy’s entrepreneurs and bankers exit. An
entrepreneur survives to the next period with a constant probability λe ∈
(0, 1), and exits with probability 1 − λe. A banker’s survival probability
is, similarly, λb ∈ (0, 1). New entrepreneurs and bankers are born in every
period to replace the exiting ones, such that the shares of entrepreneurs and
bankers in the economy remain constant over time. Consequently, also the
fraction of worker-consumers in the economy stays constant.
While a banker or an entrepreneur is active, they do not consume; they
merely engage in their banking or entrepreneurial activities and accumulate
net worth. The assumption of finite lives for bankers and entrepreneurs is
needed to ensure that they cannot accumulate wealth infinitely. When they
exit, their net worth is transferred to their household (to be consumed or
saved). A small start-up fund is allocated to each new-born banker and
entrepreneur.
The working member of the household consumes, makes saving decisions and
portfolio choices, and supplies labour in each period in a standard manner.
The representative household maximises its utility:
max
{Ct,Bt+1,It,Lt}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Lt), 0 < β < 1, (1)
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subject to a budget constraint:
PtCt + PtqtKt+1 +Bt = WtLt + Ptr
K
t Kt + (1 + rt−1)Bt−1 + PtTt, (2)
where Ct is real consumption, Bt are nominal bonds issued by the govern-
ment, Lt is labour supply, Kt is the real capital stock, and Tt are real lump
sum transfers received by the household (net lump-sum transfers or taxes
from the government, profits from the monopolistically competitive firms
owned by the household, and net returns from banking and entrepreneurial
activities). Pt is the price index, qt is the real value of capital, Wt is the
nominal wage rate, rKt is the real rental rate of capital, and rt is the nominal
short-term interest rate.
I specify a standard CES utility function for the household:
U(Ct, Lt) = Z
c
t
C1−σt
1− σ −
χL1+θt
1 + θ
.
Here σ > 0 is the risk aversion parameter, θ > 0 is the inverse of the
Frisch elasticity of labour subsitution, and χ > 0 is the labour disutility
coefficient. Zct is an exogenous preference shock, which captures real demand-
side disturbances.
This household problem leads to the following optimality condition for labour
supply and two Euler equations for bond and capital holdings:
wt = −UL(Ct, Lt)
UC(Ct, Lt)
(3)
1 = βEt
[
λt,t+1 (1 + rt)
Pt
Pt+1
]
(4)
qt = βEt
[
λt,t+1 (r
K
t+1 + (1− δ)qt+1)
]
, (5)
where λt,t+1 =
UC(Ct+1,Lt+1)
UC(Ct,Lt)
is the marginal rate of intertemporal substitu-
tion, and wt = WtPt is the real wage.
The parameter β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the discount factor of the household, σ is
the elasticity of consumption, φ is the Frisch elasticity of labour supply, and
χ > 0 is a scaling factor for the disutility of labour supply.
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2.3 Final good production
Final good producers bundle the intermediate goods Yt(i) into final goods
Yt using a standard aggregation technology
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
ε−1
ε di
) ε
ε−1
, ε > 0. (6)
There is free entry and exit in the final good sector, and the firms are per-
fectly competitive.
The maximisation problem of the final good producers, combined with the
zero-profit condition, yields the standard expressions for the demand sched-
ule of intermediate good Yt(i) and the aggregate price level Pt:
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ε
Yt (7)
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−εdi
) 1
1−ε
. (8)
2.4 Intermediate good production
There is a continuum of intermediate good producers of mass one, indexed
by i. At the beginning of each period, the intermediate firm i rents capital
Kt(i) from the household at price rKt , and employs labour Lt(i) at a nominal
wage rate Wt.
Each intermediate firm uses a Cobb-Douglas production technology
Yt(i) = ZtKt(i)
α(Lt(i))
1−α, (9)
where Zt is an exogenous total factor productivity shock.
Cost minimisation by the intermediate firm yields the standard optimality
conditions for the capital and labour demand given the relative factor prices,
10
and a condition for the real marginal cost ψt:
rKt
wt
=
αLt(i)
(1− α)Kt(i) , (10)
ψt =
(
rKt
α
)α(
wt
1− α
)(1−α)
Z−1t . (11)
Each firm is able to set its price in a staggered manner à la Calvo (1983). In
any given period, the constant probability of being able to reset the price is
1−ω, with 0 < ω < 1. The profit maximisation problem of the intermediate
firm i who is able to reset the price in period t is:
max
Pt(i)
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
ωkQt,t+k
(
Pt(i)
Pt+k
−Ψt+k|t
)
Yt+k|t(i)
]
, (12)
subject to the demand condition
Yt+k|t(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt+k
)−ε
Yt+k.
Qt,t+k = β
kλt,t+k
Pt
Pt+k
denotes the stochastic discount factor that is obtained
from the household’s optimality conditions. Ψt denotes the nominal marginal
cost.
Focusing on the symmetric equilibrium where all intermediate firms choose
the price Pt(i) = P ∗t yields the expression for the optimal price:
P ∗t =
ε
ε− 1
Et
∑∞
k=0 ω
kQt,t+k ψt+k|t Yt+k|t P ε+1t+k
Et
∑∞
k=0 ω
kQt,t+k Yt+k|t P εt+k
. (13)
In this equilibrium, the aggregate price index (8) can be written as:
Pt =
[
ωP 1−t−1 + (1− ω)(P ∗t )1−
] 1
1− , (14)
and the gross inflation rate between periods t and t− 1 as:
Πt =
[
ω + (1− ω)
(
P ∗t
Pt−1
)1−] 11−
. (15)
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2.5 Capital good production
Capital needed in the production of intermediate good is produced by the
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs can acquire external funding for the invest-
ment projects from banks. The banks, on the other hand, invest both their
own funds and the deposits of workers into the project. The details of this
three-party financing contract are given in the next section. The financial
sector is affected by agency costs created by a double moral hazard prob-
lem as formulated by Holmström and Tirole (1997) in a partial equilibrium
setting.
2.5.1 The financing contract
This section describes the partial equilibrium in the financial market. In
what follows, small letters denote individual-level variables, whereas capital
letters denote aggregate variables.
The financial sector consists of banks that channel funds from the workers to
the entrepreneurs. Workers can choose to deposit their savings at a bank2;
to attract deposits, the return on the risky investment has to be high enough
for the depositor. In this sense, the deposit is not a safe bank deposit, but
rather has to be understood as a short-term risky investment. The deposit
and the financing contract are intra-period.3 The exact timing of the events
is detailed in a later section.
An entrepreneur can borrow money from the bank in order to lever the return
to her project. However, she can choose to neglect the investment project
to obtain a private benefit. The depositor nor the banker cannot observe
whether the project was neglected or not. If the entrepreneur chooses to
neglect the project in favour of her private benefit, the productive investment
project is less likely to succeed. This presents the first form of moral hazard
in the financial sector and creates a friction to the demand side of funds,
restricting the ability of the entrepreneur to get external funding for her
project.
2To make the financial sector non-trivial, I assume that a worker cannot deposit his
savings in the bank managed by the banker in the same household; nor can the banker
lend funds to the entrepreneur in the same household.
3This is also why the deposit does not appear in the budget constraint of the household.
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In order to mitigate this moral hazard problem, the banker needs to monitor
the entrepreneur. But this has a non-verifiable cost to the banker; because
of this, he might want to forgo the monitoring. The worker observes whether
the project succeeds or not but cannot verify whether the banker properly
monitored the entrepreneur. This is the second form of moral hazard in
the financial sector, which creates a friction to the supply side of funds.
To mitigate this second moral hazard problem, and to be able to attract
deposits from the worker, the banker needs to invest some of his own funds
to be properly incentivised to monitor the project, i.e., he must have some
“skin in the game”.
Formally, if it is the size of an individual investment project, nt is the net
worth of the entrepreneur, at is the net worth of the banker, κt is the unit
cost of monitoring the investment project, and dt is the deposit of the worker
in period t, then:
it − nt ≤ at + dt − κtit (16)
gives the maximum amount of external funding an entrepreneur can get for
her project, given her own net worth.
A successful project turns it final goods into Rit capital goods with R > 1. A
failed project yields zero. The one-period contract specifies how the returns
of the project are divided between the worker (Rwt ), the banker (Rbt) and the
entrepreneur (Ret ):
R ≥ Rwt +Rbt +Ret . (17)
There are two types of projects: “good” and “bad” ones (or non-neglected and
neglected ones). The project succeeds with probability p ∈ {pH , pL}, with
∆p = pH − pL > 0 and 1 > pH > pL > 0. If the entrepreneur chooses the
good project, the success probability is pH , but there is no private benefit to
her. There is also a continuum of bad projects, each with the same success
probability pL, but with an associated positive non-verifiable private benefit
b with 0 < b ≤ b¯, proportional to the size of the project.
By choosing a monitoring intensity κt ≥ 0, the banker can prevent the
entrepreneur from choosing any of the bad projects with b ≥ b(κt). I assume
b′(κ) ≤ 0, b′′(κ) ≥ 0 and limκ→∞ b′(κ) = 0. Because monitoring is costly, it is
never possible for the banker to monitor at a level that completely eliminates
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all bad projects.
In order for the three parties to be willing to participate in the contract, the
following incentive and participation constraints must be met:
qtpHR
w
t it ≥ (1 + rt)dt (18)
qtpHR
b
t it ≥ (1 + rat )at (19)
qtpHR
b
t it − κtit ≥ qtpLRbt it (20)
qtpHR
e
t it ≥ qtpLRet it + b(κt)it (21)
Equations (16) – (21) define the financial contract. (18) is the participation
constraint of the depositor, which tells that the depositor must obtain a
gross return at least as high from participating in the project, as she would
get on the deposit otherwise; rt is the net outside return on the deposit,
which is equal to the short-term market interest rate. Similarly, (19) is the
participation constraint of the banker, where rat is the outside return on bank
capital.
(20) and (21) are the incentive constraints of the banker and the entrepre-
neur, respectively. In order for the banker to be willing to monitor the
entrepreneur, the return from the good project, net of monitoring cost, must
be at least as much than the return from the bad project. The entrepreneur,
in turn, must get at least as much from the good project as she would get
from the bad project together with the private benefit.
In equilibrium, all constraints bind.4 It is easy to see why: first, the two
resource constraints (16) and (17) are trivially binding at optimum. Second,
the compensations Ret and Rbt must be high enough to properly incentivise
the entrepreneur and banker to behave; but by the pie-sharing constraint
(17), the more is allocated to them, the less is left for the depositor, who
is the residual claimant of the project return. Thus, the depositor will not
participate unless the minimum possible shares that satisfy the incentive and
participation constraints are allocated to the entrepreneur and the banker.
As a consequence, in each period, the entrepreneur and the banker invest
their whole net worth (net of monitoring cost), as well as the whole deposit
4See Holmström and Tirole (1997) for a detailed discussion.
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of the worker, into the investment project, and the entrepreneur always un-
dertakes the good project.
In order to guarantee that the good investment project is desirable compared
to the bad projects from the household’s point of view, I further assume that
qtpHR > max{1 + rt, qtpLR+ b¯}. This assumption also guarantees that the
project has a positive rate of return (and positive pledgeable income).
2.5.2 Optimal investment and leverage
In this section, I solve for the optimal leverage ratio of the entrepreneur,
and the corresponding optimal size it of an investment project. From the
incentive constraints (20) and (21), the banker and the entrepreneur must
get at least
Rbt =
κt
qt∆p
(22)
Ret =
b(κt)
qt∆p
(23)
to be properly incentivised in equilibrium. In other words, the more severe
the moral hazard of the entrepreneur at any given monitoring level, the
more she must be compensated for undertaking the good project instead of
the bad one; and the costlier monitoring is, the more the banker has to be
compensated.
The depositor is the residual claimant of the return, who can then get at
most
Rwt = R−Rbt −Ret = R−
b(κt) + κt
qt∆p
. (24)
Therefore it is in the best interest of the depositor that the project is properly
monitored to guarantee that the good project is chosen. In equilibrium, the
entrepreneur and the banker get the minimum return that satisfies their
incentive constraints, and the depositor gets the maximum residual return.
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From the participation constraints (18) and (19) it follows:
Rwt =
(1 + rt)dt
qtpHit
(25)
Rbt =
(1 + rat )at
qtpHit
. (26)
Combining (22) with (26) yields:
at
it
=
pH
∆p
κt
1 + rat
. (27)
Further, combining (24) with (25) yields:
dt
it
=
qtpHR
1 + rt
− pH
∆p
κt + b(κt)
1 + rt
. (28)
Equations (27) and (28) indicate that the greater is the cost of monitoring,
κt, the less deposits can be attracted from the worker, as the worker cannot
be convinced as easily that the project is properly monitored. The amount
of deposits is also decreasing in the severity of the moral hazard, b(κt). On
the other hand, it is increasing in the total expected return of the project,
qtpHR.
Substituting (27) and (28) into the resource constraint (16) gives, after some
manipulation, the optimal investment as a function of the inverse leverage
gt:
it =
nt
gt
, (29)
where the inverse leverage gt ≡ g(rt, rat , qt, κt) is given by:
gt = 1− qtpHR
1 + rt
+
pH
∆p
b(κt)
1 + rt
+
(
1 +
pH
∆p
(
1
1 + rt
− 1
1 + rat
))
κt. (30)
Notice that qtpHR1+rt − 1 ≡ ρt is the net pledgeable income of the project,
i.e. maximum net excess return that the entrepreneur can promise to the
investors. Equation (30) tells that the worse the moral hazard of the entre-
preneur, the costlier monitoring, the smaller the net pledgeable income, or
the lower the real value of capital qt is, the less the entrepreneur can attract
external funding (or lever the investment size).
Now, the problem of the entrepreneur is to choose it to maximise her ex-
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pected profit, given her net worth nt and the inverse leverage gt. As the
profits are proportional to the investment size, expected profit is maximised
when it is maximised, or in other words, when the leverage ratio 1gt is max-
imised. Given prices, gt is fully determined by the monitoring intensity κt.
Let κ∗t denote the monitoring intensity that maximises the entrepreneurs
profit. Using (21) and (29), the entrepreneur’s expected profit in terms of
κ∗t can be expressed as (taking as given the prices qt, rt and rat ):
qtpHR
e
t it =
pH
∆p
b(κ∗t )nt
g(κ∗t )
. (31)
Thus, the monitoring intensity that maximises the entrepreneur’s profit is
found by solving:
κ∗t = arg max
κt
b(κt)
g(κt)
. (32)
In order to solve this problem, let us assume the following functional rela-
tionship between the monitoring intensity and the size of the private benefit:
b(κt) =
Γκ
− γ
1−γ
t if κt > κ
b¯ if κt ≤ κ.
(33)
where 0 < γ < 1, Γ > 0, b¯ > 0. In other words, there is a lower bound κ
for the efficiency of monitoring under which the maximum private benefit
is always feasible. When κt > κ, the amount of private benefit is a strictly
convex function of the monitoring intensity, increasing in Γ, and decreasing
in γ.
This specification of the monitoring technology yields the following interior
solution to the problem (32):
κ∗t =
γρt
1 + pH∆p
(
1
1+rt
− 11+rat
) , (34)
which, when substituted into equation (30), yields the following equilibrium
degree of inverse leverage:
g(κ∗t ) =
pH
∆p
b(κ∗t )
1 + rt
− (1− γ)ρt, (35)
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which in turn determines the equilibrium investment size.
The endogenous monitoring intensity κ∗t plays a key role in the dynamics of
the financial sector. If κ∗t were constant, the monitoring intensity would not
react to any disturbances in the economy. Because of this, also the private
benefit, and thus the incentives of the entpreneur, would not change. As
a result, because the ability of the banker to attract deposits depends on
the monitoring of the project, any shock that would reduce the banker’s
own capital available for investments would just be replaced by increased
deposits, and the total amount of loans would not be affected.
In contrast, when κ∗t is endogenous, it reacts to developments in the finan-
cial markets. If the banker’s net worth deteriorates, he has less resources
to monitor the entrepreneur’s project, and thus the moral hazard problem
is exacerbated. As a consequence, less deposits can be attracted, and less
loanable funds are available. Endogenous monitoring is the key driver be-
hind the financial dynamics of this model, and it is what makes bank capital
fundamentally different from entrepreneurial capital or deposits. The aggre-
gate implications of this mechanism are discussed in more detail in Section
5.
2.6 Aggregation
I focus on the symmetric equilibrium where all projects are monitored at
the same intensity κ∗t given by (34), and the capital structure, given by the
ratios of own and external funds to total investment (ntit ,
at
it
and dtit ), is equal
across entrepreneurs, bankers and depositors, respectively. Notice the size
of the project it may vary.
Then, the corresponding aggregate ratios are simply given by
Nt
It
=
nt
it
,
At
It
=
at
it
,
Dt
It
=
dt
it
, (36)
where capital letters denote aggregate amounts.
The equilibrium aggregate investment in the economy is determined by
Nt
It
= g(κ∗t ), (37)
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where g(κ∗t ) is given by equation (35).
Using the relation (27), the equilibrium rate of return to bank capital is given
by
1 + ra∗t =
1 + γρt
It
At
(1 + rt)−1 + ∆ppH
. (38)
Next, the laws of motion of the three types of capital are described by the
following equations. In equilibrium, the capital stock in the economy evolves
according to
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + pHRIt. (39)
Entrepreneurial and bank net worth are defined to evolve according to
Nt+1 = λ
e(1 + ret )
rKt+1 + (1− δ)qt+1
qt
Nt (40)
At+1 = Z
b
tλ
b(1 + rat )
rKt+1 + (1− δt)qt+1
qt
At, (41)
where rKt+1 + (1− δ)qt+1 is the marginal value of a unit of capital in period
t+ 1, which is composed of two parts: the rental income at the beginning of
the period rKt+1, and the value of undepreciated capital (1−δ)qt+1 remaining
at the end of the period.5 λe and λb are the fractions of entrepreneurs
and bankers, respectively, surviving from period t to t + 1. The return to
entrepreneurial capital is simply defined as 1 + ret ≡ qtpHR
e
t It
Nt
, which is the
ratio of expected profit to net worth.
To introduce a shock arising in the financial market into the model, I let
the accumulation of bank capital be affected by an aggregate shock, Zbt . I
assume Zbt is an AR(1) process with a normally distributed i.i.d. innovation
term. A negative shock to Zbt corresponds to an exogenous and unanticipated
decrease in the accumulation of bank capital, or in other words, a sudden
erosion of bank net worth, common to the whole banking sector. The shock
hinders the banks’ ability to extend funding to entrepreneurs, and could lead
to a credit crunch if severe enough.
Finally, by using the demand schedule (7) and the production technology
5Recall that the proceeds of the investment project, Rit, are paid in capital goods.
19
(9), the aggregate production is:
Yt = ZtK
α
t L
1−α
t , (42)
The aggregate consistency constraint of the economy is:
Yt = (Ct + It)st, (43)
where Ct denotes aggregate private consumption and It aggregate invest-
ment.6 Finally, st = (1 − ω)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−ε
+ ωΠεtst+1 ≥ 1 is the resource cost
caused by the price dispersion.
To close the model, a monetary policy for setting the nominal interest rate rt
needs to be specified. A macroprudential policy for dealing with the agency
cost in financial intermediation is not needed to close the model, but it is
required to approximate an efficient equilibrium of the model.
I start by analysing the constrained optimal policies under a social planner’s
solution in Section 4.3. Then, I look at simple policy rules that can be used
to approximate the constrained optimum, detailed in Section 5.3. The policy
rules consist of a Taylor-type rule for monetary policy, and a similar rule for
macroprudential policy that aims are mitigating the moral hazard problem
in the financial sector.
2.7 Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium of the economy is a time path{
Ct,Kt, Lt, It, At, Nt, Dt, qt, r
K
t , rt, r¯
a∗
t , r¯
e
t , wt, ψt, Pt, P
∗
t , R
b
t , R
e
t , R
w
t , κ¯
∗
t , τt
}∞
t=0
(44)
that satisfies the households’ problem, the final and intermediate firms’ prob-
lems, the optimal financing contract, and the aggregate consistency condi-
tion. The equilibrium dynamics as well as the deterministic steady state
equilibrium of the model economy are summarised in Appendix B.
6I assume that the monitoring of investment projects does not consume real resources.
If it did, the resource constraint would be Yt = Ct + (1 + κ∗t )It. This assumption is not
restrictive, as κ∗t is very small in equilibrium, and it facilitates the computation of the
steady state of the model.
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The production phase
• Households rent capitalKt and supply labour Lt to intermediate firms.
• The aggregate productivity shock Zt is realised; intermediate and final
production take place.
The consumption and investment phase
• Entrepreneurs acquire funding for new investment projects. The fi-
nancing contract is agreed upon, given Nt and At.
• Monitoring and realisation of the investment projects take place.
• The outcome of the project is observed. Returns to investment are
distributed according to the contract.
• The aggregate financial shock Zbt is realised. Entrepreneurs and
bankers accumulate net worth
• Nt+1 and At+1. Exiting bankers and entrepreneurs transfer their ac-
cumulated wealth to their household.
• The demand shock Zct is realised. Consumption and saving decisions
take place.
Table 1: Timing of events
2.8 Timing of events
The timing of the events is as follows. Each time period is divided into two
phases, described in Table 1.
3 Calibration
The calibration of the model largely follows the calibration strategy discussed
in Haavio et al. (2015). Assuming that a steady state investment subsidy is
in place, so that steady state investments are at the efficient level, the steady
state of the New Keynesian macro block is not affected by the parameters of
the financial sector. Thus the macro and the financial block can be calibrated
independently.
The macro block of the model is calibrated in a standard fashion in the New-
Keynesian literature to match a quarterly frequency in data, in order for the
model to be easily comparable to a benchmark New Keynesian model without
financial frictions. The parameter values are summarised in the upper panel
of Table 2.
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Panel 1: New Keynesian block
Discount factor β 0.9951
Risk aversion σ 2
Habit persistence b 0
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.025
Elasticity of substitution (mark-up: 10 %)  11
Capital share α 0.33
Frisch elasticity of labour supply θ 0.5
Disutility of labour supply ξ 2
Calvo parameter ω 0.8
Persistence of productivity shock ρ 0.95
Persistence of preference shock ρc 0.7
Std. dev. of productivity shock σ 0.006
Std. dev. of preference shock σc 0.005
Panel 2: Financial block
Elasticity of monitoring γ 0.2992
Monitoring intensity Γ 0.0017
Survival rate of entrepreneurs λe 0.9842
Survival rate of bankers λb 0.9507
Success probability of good project pH 0.95
Gross return of investment project: R = 1pH R 1.0526
Probability differential ∆p 0.0454
Persistence of bank capital depreciation shock ρb 0
Std. dev. of bank capital depreciation shock σb 0.006
Table 2: Benchmark calibration of the model
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The financial block is calibrated to match some steady state characteristics
of the model. The entrepreneur and banker survival rates, λe and λb respec-
tively, are calibrated to match a steady state excess return on entrepreneurial
capital of 4.5 % and an excess return on (core) private bank capital of 20 %
per annum, compared to the short-term market interest rate. These values
are consistent with the the estimates in Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009).
The calibration of the monitoring parameters γ and Γ pin down the moni-
toring cost in the steady state, and also steady state leverage, because the
steady state entrepreneur leverage is fully determined by the monitoring in-
tensity. On the other hand, also bank leverage depends on the monitoring
intensity, as it determines its ability to attract deposits. Hence, these two
parameters are the key parameters governing the financial sector dynamics.
The exact cost of monitoring activities in banks is hard to pin down empir-
ically. Banks’ overheard costs as a fraction of total assets in the U.S. are
estimated to be around 3 % by the World Bank (2013). Overhead costs,
however, include also costs not related to monitoring activities. Philippon
(2014) estimates that the unit cost of financial intermediation has been sta-
ble at around 1.5% to 2% in the U.S. over the past decades. The calibration
of γ and Γ matches a per annum monitoring cost of 1.2 % of total bank
assets in steady state.
The leverage of non-financial U.S. firms is estimated to be around 2.3-2.5
by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011). They also find that leverage ratios of fi-
nancial firms are very heterogenous in the U.S. and depend on the type of
the bank. Large investment banks have leverage ratios in the order of 20,
while commercial banks typically have leverage ratios ranging around 10-12.
The elasticity of monitoring and monitoring intensity are calibrated in such
a way as to produce a leverage ratio of around 1.5 for non-financial firms
(entrepreneurs, in this model), and a leverage ratio of 16.5 for banks.
The success probability of the good project and the gross return from the
project, pH and R, are normalised such that pHR = 1, which makes the
evolution of the aggregate capital accumulation comparable to the standard
New Keynesian case. I set pH = 0.95, which implies a net return R − 1 on
the investment project equal to approximately 5%.
Finally, the financial shock is calibrated to be purly transitory at φb = 0.
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The standard deviance of the shock is calibrated to be the same than that
of the productivity shock. The parameters of such a financial shock is hard
to pin down empirically, but the calibration is intended to represent the
financial shock as a strong but brief event on the financial markets. Given
that it takes time for banks hit by the shock to rebuild their capital stock,
the transitory shock has persistent effects.
4 The constrained optimum
This section discusses the implications of the agency problem in financial
intermediation, and analyses the constrained optimal solution under both
flexible and sticky prices, when the moral hazard problem is nonetheless
present. Optimal policy responses of the Ramsey planner are presented
through impulse response analysis, and the efficiency of the optimum is dis-
cussed. The efficient first-best optimum, to which the constrained optimal
solutions are compared, is the equilibrium of the standard flexible price real
business cycle (RBC) model without any friction in financial intermediation.
It turns out that if the model economy suffers from both a nominal and
a financial friction, the Ramsey planner needs two separate instruments to
reach an efficient optimum. After the optimal policy analysis, I will compare
the results to dynamics under non-optimised simple policy rules in the next
section.
4.1 Implications of the financial friction
In addition to the nominal friction arising from staggered price setting, and
the inefficiency caused by monopolistic competition in intermediate good
production, there is an additional real friction compared to the standard
New Keynesian model: the friction arising from the agency costs in the
financial sector.
Let us focus on the flexible price model (where ω = 0). If b(κt) = 0, i.e. there
are no private benefits available for the entrepreneur, and consequently, no
need for monitoring (κt = 0), the incentive constraints (20) and (21) always
hold: there is no incentive problem.
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Then, the entrepreneur and the banker are indifferent between undertaking
the good project and not when Ret = Rbt = 0. The depositor-worker receives
the whole gross return, Rwt = R. In this case, the financial intermediation
becomes “invisible” in the sense that it is as if the worker himself would
directly undertake the project, i.e. the household becomes a capital producer.
This is in essence equal to the standard flexible price RBC model, where the
household’s savings are directly channelled into productive investment. As a
consequence, aggregate investment equals household savings in equilibrium:
It = Dt. The RBC model is thus nested within the model presented in
this paper, and makes comparison with the dynamics of the standard model
straightforward.
Frictions in the financial market cause aggregate investments to be at a sub-
optimal level. When these frictions are present, aggregate investments It
depend on the total amount of entrepreneurial and bank capital, Nt and
At, and – through their effect on leverage – on the size of private benefits
b(κt) and the monitoring intensity κt. The more severe the incentive prob-
lems, the less funds can be channelled into the investment projects. The
inefficiency of credit intermediation is exacerbated by the monitoring cost:
because of it, less resources are available for productive investments. Both
the entrepreneurs and the bankers are capital-constrained.
4.2 Constrained optimum in a flexible price economy
This section and the following sections present the model dynamics under
Ramsey-optimal policy plans. The Ramsey policy problem consists of max-
imising the household’s lifetime welfare (1) conditional on the non-linear
equilibrium conditions of the private sector in the model economy. I then
approximate the optimality conditions of the Ramsey problem by a first-
order Taylor approximation in logs around the deterministic steady state of
the model. The choice variables of the Ramsey planner in this setup are
either the inflation rate, or both the inflation rate and the level of invest-
ments; the planner is assumed to be able to set the values of these variables
directly. The Ramsey planner is assumed to act under commitment.
I discuss the responses of the approximated model to various shocks through
impulse response analysis. All figures presented in the following sections
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show the resulting dynamics as percentage deviations from steady state val-
ues.
An efficient allocation requires that investments be at the level determined
by a perfectly competitive and frictionless economy. Let us for a moment
drop the assumptions of monopolistic competition and sticky prices, and
concentrate on the model where prices are fully flexible and intermediate
good production is perfectly competitive, but the moral hazard problem in
financial intermediation is present. The government can replicate the efficient
steady-state allocation by introducing a constant investment subsidy that
restores the efficient amount of investment. In the analysis presented in the
following sections, it is assumed that such a subsidy is in place; see Appendix
B.2 for details.
In order to analyse the constrained optimal dynamic equilibrium, I look at
a social planner’s problem. The Ramsey policy problem of a social planner
is described in technical detail in Appendix C. Assume that the planner
cannot remove the moral hazard problem (i.e cannot make b(κt) = 0 feasible
for any value of κt), but can set the level of investments directly to the value
that maximises household welfare7. This Ramsey policy problem leads to
the constrained optimal equilibrium.
The constrained optimum is defined as being efficient when it replicates the
flexible price perfect competition outcome, which is the first-best outcome.
In the flexible price economy where the financial friction is present, the fluc-
tuation of the real price of capital (qt) away from unity creates a wedge
between the first-best and the actual outcome. The value of Tobin’s q fixed
at unity is a key feature of the flexible price RBC model, which follows from
the frictionless adjustment of capital. In order to replicate the first-best, the
Ramsey planner thus needs to offset this wedge.
Figure 1 shows the response of the economy to a one-standard-deviation
negative productivity shock. The figure illustrates that the constrained op-
timal solution of the social planner is efficient: the allocation replicates the
first-best (unconstrained) optimum, which in this case is the flexible price
frictionless outcome, denoted by the solid black line in the figure. The solid
7This policy can be thought of as a set of transfers in each period between the en-
trepreneurs, the bankers and the depositors that reallocates wealth in a way to achieve
the optimal level of investments
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Flexible price RBC Constrained−optimal RBC No intervention
Figure 1: Effects of a one percent negative total factor productivity shock in
the RBC model. “Flexible price RBC”: model with fully flexible prices and
no financial friction. “Constrained-optimal RBC”: model with fully flexible
prices, but with the financial friction. “No intervention”: model with fully
flexible prices, but with the financial friction; no policy intervention.
grey line denotes the response in the economy with financial frictions when
a social planner intervenes by implementing the Ramsey policy, and the
dashed line indicates the response of the economy with financial frictions
and no policy intervention.
The output gap Xt is defined as the gap between actual output in a given
model and the output in the flexible price RBC model: Xt = YtY et , where Yt
is the actual output and Y et is the efficient level of output8.
The shock increases marginal costs of firms and results in inflationary pres-
sure. Capital demand by intermediate firms decreases, but because of the
financial friction – as entrepreneurs attempt to continue undertaking invest-
ment projects to keep accumulating wealth – less than in the frictionless
RBC economy. Without any policy intervention, this results in a positive
8The efficient level of output is a benchmark computed as the output level achievable
with the resources of the economy in the absence of monopolistic competition, the pricing
friction, and the financial friction.
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Figure 2: Effects of a one percent negative bank capital shock in the RBC
model. “Flexible price RBC”: model with fully flexible prices and no finan-
cial friction. “Constrained-optimal RBC”: model with fully flexible prices,
but with the financial friction; policy intervention by the planner. “No in-
tervention”: model with fully flexible prices, but with the financial friction;
no policy intervention.
output gap as investment does not adjust enough, and in a fall in real capital
price qt as a result of the weakened demand for capital.
Instead, with policy intervention, the social planner sets the level of invest-
ments to the level that maximises household welfare, given the friction in the
financial sector. This corresponds to a re-allocation of resources between the
three parties of the financial contract in such a way as to keep the real price
of capital, qt, fixed at unity. First, the planner transfers resources from the
entrepreneur to the banker. This allows the banker to increase the monitor-
ing intensity and attract more deposits. The entrepreneur however has less
net worth and can undertake only smaller projects. Thus the demand for
loanable funds decreases, which then decreases the supply of new capital in
the economy, driving up the capital price qt. The stabilisation of Tobin’s q
allows to replicate the first-best outcome for the aggregate macro variables,
specifically the efficient level of investments.
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Figure 3: Effects of a one percent negative total factor productivity shock in
the New Keynesian model. “Inflation choice”: model with sticky prices and
the financial friction; social planner sets the inflation rate. “Inflation and
investment choice”: model with sticky prices and the financial friction; social
planner sets the inflation rate and the level of investments. “Flexible price
RBC”: the frictionless flexible price (first-best) benchmark.
An exactly similar logic applies to stabilising the economy after a negative
bank capital shock, shown in Figure 2, and the first-best outcome can again
be replicated. In this case, the destruction of bank capital interferes with
the banker’s ability to extend loans for new projects, such that the supply of
new capital decreases and the capital price qt increases, if there is no policy
intervention, as shown by the dashed lines. The social planner transfers
resources from the depositor and the banker to the entrepreneur, who can
then invest in more capital-producing projects without external funding from
the market. This pushes down the capital price, as the demand for loans is
reduced.
Appendix A reports the corresponding results of a shock to the stochastic
discount factor, which is a demand shock. Here, the same conclusion holds:
two policy variables are needed to reach the efficient constrained optimum.
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4.3 Constrained optimum in a sticky price economy
Next, let us re-introduce the nominal rigidity into the model. Now, besides
the financial friction, there are the standard New Keynesian frictions – price
stickiness and monopolistic competition in intermediate production – affect-
ing the economy. As was seen in the previous section, the social planner’s
solution is efficient when prices are fully flexible, but the financial friction is
present, when the planner can optimally set the level of investments.
With all of these frictions at work, the planner has to offset fluctuations
caused not only by the agency problem, but also those caused by price stick-
iness and monopolistic competition to achieve efficiency of the constrained
optimum. I first look at the case where the planner only has one policy
variable that he can set. Namely, the planner controls monetary policy and
sets the rate of inflation to maximise household welfare.
The solid lines in Figure 3 show the response of the economy to a negative
productivity shock, when the social planner optimally sets the inflation rate.
With only one policy variable, the planner cannot fully offset the shock.
The planner sets the inflation rate to zero. However, a positive output gap
opens up, while at the same time Tobin’s q drops. The planner is not able
to stabilise both, as the two move in opposite directions. On the one hand,
the inflationary pressure caused by the productivity shock would warrant an
increase in the nominal interest rate. On the other hand, to push up the
capital price, the nominal rate would need to be lowered. The presence of
two distinct inefficiencies – sticky prices and the financial friction – create a
policy trade-off. The constrained optimum when the planner has only one
policy variable is not efficient, as it does not fully replicate the first best
outcome (the flexible price RBC equilibrium).
Contrast this result with the standard New Keynesian model, where no finan-
cial friction exists: a Ramsey planner can replicate the first-best by fully sta-
bilising inflation, assuming that there is a steady-state employment subsidy
in place that offsets the steady state mark-up of the intermediate producers.
In contrast, the dashed lines in Figures 3 show the constrained optimal re-
sponse when the planner controls two policy variables besides the static em-
ployment subsidy: inflation rate and the investment level. Now the first best
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Figure 4: Effects of a one percent negative bank capital shock in the New
Keynesian model. “Inflation choice”: model with sticky prices and the finan-
cial friction; social planner sets the inflation rate. “Inflation and investment
choice”: model with sticky prices and the financial friction; social planner
sets the inflation rate and the level of investments. “Flexible price RBC”: the
frictionless flexible price (first-best) benchmark.
outcome can be replicated, and the constrained optimum is efficient. One
policy variable can be used to offset the distortion caused by price stickiness
by stabilising inflation, and the other to offset the distortion in financial in-
termediation by stabilising Tobin’s q, so that the policy trade-off is resolved.
The same applies when the economy is hit by a bank capital shock, as de-
picted in Figure 4.9 With only one policy variable, the planner cannot fully
offset the shocks. In both cases, Tobin’s q and the output gap move in
opposite directions, causing a policy trade-off. This trade-off can only be
resolved by adding a second policy variable that can deal with the wedge in
real capital price.
In particular, after a bank capital shock, when the planner only controls the
inflation rate, the deterioration of bank capital causes a drop in investments
and leads to a negative output gap. At the same time, the decrease in capital
9Results for a demand shock are reported in Appendix A.
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stock leads to an increase in the real price of capital and causes households
to substitute savings for current consumption, which reinforces the drop
in investments. In contrast, when the planner can also control the level of
investments, the planner can reallocate resources from the depositors and the
banks to the entrepreneurs and stabilise Tobin’s q, as the ability of banks to
finance investments is reduced.
5 Simple policy rules
The Ramsey policy plans described above represent a constrained optimal
solution to setting the monetary and macroprudential policies. The Ramsey
policy is, however, a rather abstract policy plan that serves as a benchmark
for simpler policy plans and as a tool to help understand how the frictions
in the model economy should be dealt with. In particular, the kind of trans-
fers needed in each period to replicate the first-best are likely very hard to
implement in a more realistic setting.
From the optimal policy analysis, it becomes clear that the policymaker needs
(at least) two separate policy instruments in order to stabilise the economic
fluctuations: one to deal with inflation, and one to deal with the financial
frictions. A need for separate macroprudential regulation then naturally
arises in this context. A way to approximate the Ramsey-optimal transfer
plans are dynamic taxes and subsidies on either the entrepreneur or the
banker.
In the next sections, I analyse the dynamics of the model economy under
various simple policy rules. First, as a benchmark, I look at how the economy
performs under a conventional Taylor rule type policy, where the monetary
authority reacts to inflation and output gap. This means that there is no
macroprudential policy, and the monetary authority is not directly concerned
with any financial developments. Then, I consider an augmented Taylor rule,
where in addition to inflation and output gap, the central bank also reacts to
the real capital price, which in this model is the key channel through which
the real economy and the financial markets are linked. Finally, I analyse
the dynamics of the model economy where conventional monetary policy is
supplemented by an independent macroprudential policy: there is a rule-
based policy that deals with financial imbalances, and the central bank only
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Policies Instruments
(i) MP Taylor rule
(ii) MP + MR Augmented Taylor rule
(iii) MP + MR Taylor rule + leverage tax
(iv) MP + MR Taylor rule + investment subsidy
Table 3: Policy regimes under simple rules. MP: monetary policy; MR: macro-
prudential policy. Instruments: policy instruments at use.
targets inflation and output gap using a standard Taylor rule.
5.1 Policy mandates
As was seen in the previous section, the stabilisation of the economy requires
in general two distinct policy tools to deal with the two separate frictions.
The key to stabilising the economy, i.e. to close the output gap in order
to replicate the first-best flexible price allocation, is to stabilise inflation on
the one hand, and Tobin’s q on the other hand. A potential trade-off arises,
because Tobin’s q moves in the opposite direction from the output gap.
The Ramsey policies assume that the policymakers act under commitment,
observe all variables in the economy, and can set the instrument values to
maximise the household’s lifetime welfare. In a more realistic model, the pol-
icymakers use simple policy rules, which react to a few key variables. Several
possible combinations of policy rules are considered here. I investigate how
closely the optimal policy plans can be approximated with these policy rules.
Based on the Ramsey policy analysis, the question arises: what is the most
suitable policy mandate – one where the monetary authority jointly deals
with both price and financial stability, or one where distinct authorities deal
with each friction? The Ramsey planner, by jointly setting both inflation
and investments, can replicate the first best. The responses to both inflation
and financial imbalances are perfectly coordinated in the sense that they
are jointly optimal, and set to maximise the same objective, the household
welfare. However, in the absence of such a Ramsey planner, it is not imme-
diately clear what the policy targets should be and how the policy mandates
should be divided.
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The simple policy rule set-ups simulate four distinct policy regimes: (i) a
regime where only conventional monetary policy that aims at price stability
is conducted; (ii) a regime where the monetary authority deals with both
price stability and financial stability; and two different regimes where there
are two independent policymakers, one for the monetary policy and one for
the macroprudential policy, each with their own policy targets: regimes (iii)
and (iv), respectively.
The next question is what the specific macroprudential policy should be, if
monetary policy is not concerned with financial stability directly as in cases
(iii) and (iv) described above. Two specific tools for financial stability are
considered: a leverage tax/subsidy on banks, and a tax/subsidy scheme on
investment returns of the entrepreneurs. The former restricts bank lending
in an expansion and supports it in a recession by controlling their leverage,
and thus aims at stabilising credit intermediation. The latter subsidises the
returns of the investment projects when they are too low compared to first-
best, i.e. when Tobin’s q is below unity and thus stimulates investments,
and taxes them when investment demand is too high and Tobin’s q is above
unity. These policies are detailed in Section 5.2.
The policy regimes are summarised in Table 3. The first column specifies
which policies are at use: monetary policy, or both monetary and macropru-
dential policies. The second column specifies the policy instruments.
Each of these regimes is then compared against the first-best allocation,
i.e. the perfect competition flexible price RBC model. In Section 6, I com-
pute welfare measures that further quantify the performance of the different
regimes.
The first regime (on the first row of Table 3) consists of a conventional mon-
etary policy rule, which reacts to inflation and output gap. The parameters
are chosen to correspond to conventional values in the literature: a weight of
1.5 is given on inflation, and a weight of 0.5 on the output gap. This policy
regime consists of one where there is no separate macroprudential policy at
all, and conventional monetary policy is assumed to be enough to stabilise
the economy.
Next, on the second row of Table 3, the second regime consists of an aug-
mented monetary policy rule. In addition to inflation and output gap with
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the same weight as above, the monetary authority reacts to the real price of
capital, or Tobin’s q, with a weight of unity, so that fluctuations in q are off-
set one-to-one, other things equal. The price of capital was found to be the
key variable to stabilise in order to offset the financial friction and replicate
the first-best. This policy regime corresponds to one where the central bank
tries to explicitly deal with financial imbalances as well as price stability, but
only has one instrument at use. It is a dual mandate, and could be thought
of as an approximate counterpart to the Ramsey policy with inflation choice
only.
Finally, the third and fourth regime are ones where the tasks of price and
financial stability are divided to two different authorities with different pol-
icy targets. These are described in the third and fourth rows of Table 3.
Monetary policy follows a standard Taylor rule, with the same conventional
weights as in the first regime described above. In addition, there is a macro-
prudential policy that aims at financial stability. I look at two different
macroprudential policies. The first is a cyclical leverage tax on banks, which
targets the loans-to-output ratio of the economy. When this ratio is above its
steady-state level, the tax is positive, so that the banks’ aggregate leverage
is reduced and lending and thus investment is restricted. When this ratio
is below its steady-state level, in a downturn, bank lending is subsidised to
stimulate lending.
The second macroprudential policy is a subsidy on investment returns. If
Tobin’s q is above one, i.e. there is too much investment relative to the
first-best, it is a transfer from banks and entrepreneurs to depositors that
makes investments less profitable and drives down Tobin’s q. Conversely,
when Tobin’s q is below unity and investment is low relative to first-best,
it is a subsidy on investments that make them more profitable. This policy
aims at stabilising the value of q to unity.
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Regime Taylor rule Leverage tax Investment tax
[φΠ φx φq] φτ 1− ςt
(i) [1.5 0.5 0] 0 no
(ii) [1.5 0.5 1] 0 no
(iii) [1.5 0.5 0] 1 no
(iv) [1.5 0.5 0] 0 yes
Table 4: Calibration of policy parameters. Regimes: (i) standard Taylor rule; (ii)
augmented Taylor rule; (iii) standard Taylor rule and leverage tax; (iv) standard Taylor
rule and investment tax.
5.2 Monetary and macroprudential policy rules
5.2.1 Monetary policy
First, the central bank sets the nominal short-term interest rate rt using a
Taylor rule:
1 + rt =
1
β
Πφpit X
φx
t q
φq
t , (45)
where Πt is the period-to-period gross inflation rate, Xt = YtY et is the output
gap, and qt is the real price of capital. The calibration of the policy param-
eters is given in Table 4. The “standard‘” Taylor rule refers to a rule which
only reacts to inflation and output gap and sets φq to zero. The “augmented”
Taylor rule refers to a rule which sets φq different from zero.
5.2.2 Macroprudential policy
I assume that the government follows a balanced budget policy, and that both
the leverage tax/subsidy scheme and the investment tax/subsidy scheme is
financed by lump sum taxes and transfers on households. This implies that
the households’ optimal decisions are not affected.
The bank leverage tax
First, the leverage tax on banks, while rather abstract, can under these
conditions also be interpreted as a bank resolution fund. The quantitative
effects of the tax on banking sector dynamics are similar to capital ratio
regulation (as, for example, discussed in Christensen et al. (2011)) but the
advantage of the fiscal approach is that unlike a restriction on the capital
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ratio of the bank, the leverage tax does not impose a constraint on the bank’s
choice of monitoring intensity, and the financing problem remains simple and
tractable.
Formally, bank leverage is defined as the ratio of total assets to net worth.
Bank net worth is equal to the bank’s own capital at, and the total liabilities
of the banking sector are composed of bank capital and deposits, at + dt.
As an accounting identity, total assets are equal in size to total liabilities.
Then, bank leverage can be defined as:
B = at + dt
at
. (46)
The financial regulator imposes a time-varying tax τt on bank leverage, or
equivalently, on the bank’s total assets. Then, the after-tax net leverage is:
B¯t = (1− τt)Bt = (1− τt)at + dt
at
. (47)
When τt > 0, the financial regulator imposes a tax on the bank’s total assets
that restricts bank leverage. When τt < 0, the regulator subsidizes bank
leverage, which stimulates bank lending.
The funding constraint of the bank under this tax is:
it − nt + κtit ≤ (1− τt)(at + dt). (48)
The bank now has to use its own capital and the deposits to finance both
the loan to the entrepreneur and the monitoring of the project, as well as to
pay for the tax.
The variables net of tax, as well as the aggregate variables, can then be
derived exactly as presented in Section 2.
The financial regulator sets the level of the tax according to a Taylor-type
policy rule. The policy target is the credit-to-output ratio Υt = It−NtYt . When
this ratio is above its steady state level Υ = I−NY , i.e. the “credit gap”
Υt
Υ is
above unity, the tax rate is positive. When the ratio is below its steady state
level, the tax rate is negative, i.e. it is a subsidy to lending. The steady-state
level of the tax is set to zero, so that the steady state of the economy is not
affected by the distortionary tax/subsidy transfer.
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This choice of target means that the macroprudential policy seeks to restrain
the indebtedness of the economy, of which the credit-to-output ratio is a
simple measure.
Specifically, the leverage tax is set according to the rule:
1 + τt =
(
Υt
Υ
)φΥ
, (49)
where φΥ is the policy parameter defining the intensity of the policy.
The investment tax
Alternatively, the financial sector can be controlled through a tax and sub-
sidy scheme on the returns of the investment projects. The goal is to stabilise
Tobin’s q at unity to remove the effects of the agency costs on the level of
investments.
On the demand side of loanable funds, the real price of capital is related to
the pledgeable income of the investment project through the definition of
the pledgeable income:
ρt =
qtpHR
1 + rt
− 1
⇔ qt = (1 + ρt)(1 + rt)
pHR
(50)
Now define R(1 − ςt) as the taxed return on the project when ςt > 0, and
subsidised return when ςt < 0. Then, the policy objective is to set ςt such
that the taxed price of capital q∗t is:
q∗t =
(1 + ρt)(1 + rt)
pHR(1− ςt) = 1. (51)
By rearranging and substituting (34) for ρt, the tax that fulfils this condition
is:
1− ςt =
[
1 + rt + γ
−1κ∗t
(
1 + rt +
pH
∆p
(
1− 1 + rt
1 + rat
))]
(pHR)
−1. (52)
This tax transfers a share of the project return from the entrepreneur to
the household (the depositor), and vice verse if it is a subsidy. The funding
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Figure 5: Policy response to a one percent adverse productivity shock. “Tay-
lor rule”: the financial frictions model with standard Taylor rule that reacts
to inflation and output gap; “Augmented Taylor rule”: the financial frictions
model with an augmented Taylor rule that reacts to inflation, otuput gap and
real capital price; ”Leverage tax”: the financial frictions model with standard
Taylor rule and leverage tax; “Investment tax”: the financial frictions model
with standard Taylor rule and investment subsidy. “Tax/subsidy” panel: a
positive figure indicates a tax, a negative figure a subsidy.
constraint (17) of the financing problem becomes:
R(1− ςt) = Ret +Rbt +Rwt . (53)
5.3 Dynamics under simple policy rules
Figure 5 shows the policy responses to a negative productivity shock in the
economy with financial frictions. The shock is inflationary and produces a
positive output gap, so that monetary policy responds by raising the nominal
interest rate.
The adverse shock also affects financial intermediation. There is downward
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pressure in investments, which decreases lending. The weakened demand for
capital pushes down the real price of capital. When a macroprudential policy
is active – in all cases except under the first regime where only a conventional
Taylor rule is at use, shown by the solid black lines – it attempts to address
this issue.
The augmented Taylor rule, shown in solid grey lines, attempts to offset
the fall in real capital price q by raising the interest rate less than when
monetary policy does not react to qt, but in doing so it allows for a greater
output gap, as the two move in opposite directions. The fall in real capital
price, however, decreases inflationary pressure.
The investment tax also reacts directly to the downward pressure in qt. The
policy reactions under this regime are shown in dashed grey lines. By im-
posing a tax on investment returns, the policy encourages more consumption
and less saving by the households, which leads to less supply of funds for
investment. This removes the downward pressure from the capital price, and
the policy stabilises qt at the desired value of unity. At the same time, the
monetary policy is left to take care of the inflation, but the stabilisation of
qt removes some of the inflationary pressure, so that monetary policy does
not need to react as aggressively as under the other policy regimes.
Finally, the policy regime with a leverage tax, which aims at smoothing out
credit cycles by stabilising the loans-to-output ratio, imposes a subsidy on
banks’ total assets. This policy mix does stabilise financial intermediation,
and it is the only policy that leads to improved monitoring resources (and
a mitigation of the moral hazard problem). At the same time, however, it
prevents investments from adjusting enough to the new productivity levels.
As a consequence, both inflation and output gap outcomes are worse than
without the tax, and the monetary policy has to counteract the macropru-
dential policy by raising the nominal interest rate more than it otherwise
would have to.
In contrast, when the shock arises in the financial sector, the leverage tax
can be helpful. Figure 6 shows the policy responses to a negative shock to
bank net worth. Such a shock results in a deterioration of bank capital,
which hinders the banks’ ability to monitor investment projects. This in
turn worsens the moral hazard problem, discourages depositors, and leads
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Figure 6: Policy response to a one percent adverse bank capital shock. “Tay-
lor rule”: the financial frictions model with standard Taylor rule that reacts
to inflation and output gap; “Augmented Taylor rule”: the financial frictions
model with an augmented Taylor rule that reacts to inflation, otuput gap and
real capital price; ”Leverage tax”: the financial frictions model with standard
Taylor rule and leverage tax; “Investment tax”: the financial frictions model
with standard Taylor rule and investment subsidy. “Tax/subsidy” panel: a
positive figure indicates a tax, a negative figure a subsidy.
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to higher requirements of entrepreneurial capital. The decrease in lending
translates into decreased investments and output.
However, the shock is also inflationary, because the drop in investments
implies an increase in the real price of capital, which in turn encourages
households to subsitute savings for consumption. The shock also leads to a
persistently lower level of bank capital and lending, because it takes time for
banks to re-accumulate net worth.
Now, if the leverage tax is active, the macroprudential policy can support
the banks and stabilise credit intermediation, which dampens the effect of
the financial shock to real economic activity considerably. In particular, the
impact of the shock on inflation is negative, as the shock’s effect on the real
price of capital is dampened. As the inflationary pressure is removed, mon-
etary policy, supported by macroprudential policy, can instead act on the
negative output gap and decrease the interest rate. In addition, bank capi-
tal levels are restored much more quickly thanks to the subsidy. In a sense,
the policymaker “bails out” banks by providing more capital. The availabil-
ity of two separate policy tools removes the policy trade-off. The investment
subsidy has a similar effect: it increases the profits of the bankers and en-
trepreneurs from the investment projects, which also stimulates investments
and helps banks rebuild their balance sheets.
In turn, the augmented Taylor rule does not perform very well, as it cannot
stop the shock from propagating from the financial sector to the real economy
as well as a separate macroprudential policy can.
This shows that when there are shocks arising in the financial sector itself,
there are benefits to a separate macroprudential tool. However, restricting
bank leverage can be counterproductive in stabilising fluctuations caused by
shocks arising from outside, but affecting, the financial sector. Controlling
investment returns might be a more convenient tool in regulating credit
cycles, as it affects the price of investment, not the stock of bank capital
available for investment projects. This also highlights the importance of
credit intermediation as a channel through which the economy adjusts to
real shocks by adapting the level of investments.
When shocks arise from outside of the financial sector but affect financial
intermediation, a unified, dual mandate of the monetary authority can be
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beneficial. A coordinated response from one policymaker – here in the form
of an augmented Taylor rule, which reacts explicitly both to inflation and
real asset prices – seems to yield good results.
These simple examples demonstrate that there is scope for a separate macro-
prudential tool in dealing with disturbances that arise from the financial sec-
tor itself, but also a need to identify the sources of business cycle fluctuations,
as well as to properly coordinate the use of monetary and macroprudential
policies. The design of the macroprudential policy matters a great deal.
In the next section, I quantify the welfare effects of the different policy
regimes. While the quantitative differences in welfare under the different
policy regimes are small, the exercise can provide us with an ordering of the
regimes in terms of household welfare, compared to the first-best outcome.
6 Welfare analysis
In this section, I evaluate the performance of the different policy regimes.
I compute the welfare cost associated with each policy as consumption-
equivalent amounts relative to a benchmark policy. The welfare evaluation
follows the strategy described in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006). The de-
tails of the derivation of the welfare measure are outlined in Appendix D.
The consumption-equivalent welfare cost is defined as the fixed fraction of
consumption that the household must give up under the benchmark policy
regime, in each period, to be indifferent between the benchmark policy and
the policy it is being compared to. A positive cost indicates that the house-
hold is better off under the benchmark policy. The benchmark model to
which the others are compared here is the flexible price RBC model, which
yields the first-best allocation. In the RBC model, both the financial friction
and the nominal friction are absent. The details of the computation of the
consumption-equivalent welfare measure is given in Appendix D.
The third column of Table 5 reports the welfare costs of the different policy
regimes. In addition, the fourth and fifth columns of Table 5 display the
standard deviations of inflation and output gap in percentages, respectively,
under the different policy regimes.
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Model Policy Welfare cost (%) 100× σpi 100× σx
RBC - 0.000 0.000
FF Ramsey 2 var. 0.000 0.000 0.000
” Ramsey 1 var. 0.001 0.006 0.093
” Aug. Taylor rule 0.004 0.036 0.413
” Investment tax 0.009 0.072 0.080
” Taylor rule 0.020 0.111 0.214
” Leverage tax 0.037 0.141 0.512
Table 5: Consumption-equivalent welfare costs under different policies, rel-
ative to the flexible price RBC model. A positive figure indicates a welfare loss
relative to the first-best. “RBC‘” refers to the perfect competition, flexible price RBC
model, and “FF” to the model with both the financial friction and the nominal rigidity.
“Ramsey 2 var.”: Ramsey policy which sets inflation rate and investment level. “Ramsey 1
var.”: Ramsey policy which sets inflation rate only. “Augmented Taylor rule”: Taylor rule
reacting to inflation, output gap and real capital price. “Investment subsidy”: Standard
Taylor rule and investment tax/subsidy. “Taylor rule”: Standard Taylor rule reacting to
inflation and output gap. “Leverage tax”: Standard Taylor rule and leverage tax/subsidy.
σpi: Standard deviation of inflation. σx: Standard deviation of output gap.
First, the welfare costs compared to the first-best allocation are small in
absolute terms under any policy regime. For example, the worst-performing
policy (entitled “Leverage tax” in the table) results in a welfare cost of 0.04 %
of consumption in each period compared to the first-best. This magnitude
is in line with many earlier studies comparing welfare effects of different
monetary policy regimes.10 The welfare analysis allows, however, to order
the different policies by welfare losses and thus compare their desirability in
qualitative terms.
Notably, as was demonstrated in Section 4.3, a Ramsey planner who can
optimally set both the inflation and the investment level, can replicate the
first-best allocation: the welfare cost to the household under this policy
regime is zero, and both inflation and output gap are fully stabilised. The
availability of two distinct policy variables is required to offset both frictions
in the economy. This result is demonstrated in the second row of Table 5.
The single-variable Ramsey problem, where the planner can only set the in-
10The seminal discussion by Lucas (2003) finds consumption-equivalent welfare gains
from eliminating business cycle fluctuations, in general, to be roughly in the order of
magnitude of 0.05 %.
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flation rate, is nested within the two-variable problem. Interestingly, when
there are financial frictions in the economy, it is optimal to focus on stabilis-
ing inflation, but not the output gap, as shown in the third row of the table:
the standard deviation of inflation is very close to zero, while the standard
deviation of output gap is clearly positive. Thus some deviation from the
first-best output is traded off for price stability.
The rule-based policies do not fall far behind in welfare levels compared to
the two Ramsey policies. The best regime is the augmented Taylor rule,
shown on the fourth row of the table, and second comes the policy mix
that which combines a standard Taylor rule for monetary policy with an
investment tax/subsidy, shown on the fifth row. These two policies come
very close to the Ramsey-optimal policy plans in terms of welfare losses.
The augmented Taylor rule achieves a very low inflation volatility, but a
relatively high output gap volatility.
The welfare evaluation seems to somewhat contradict earlier results in mon-
etary policy literature. The general view in the literature is that the central
bank need not concern itself with asset price fluctuations, except insofar as
they reflect changes expected inflation.11 In this model, even when prices
are fully flexible, the fluctuations of real asset prices reflect the sub-optimal
levels of investment caused by the agency cost, and it is beneficial for the
policymaker to react to them.
The economy where both an interest rate rule and a rule-based leverage tax is
in use fares the worst in terms of household welfare. As discussed in Section
5.3, the cyclical leverage tax is counter-productive except when stabilising
financial shocks. This is confirmed by the fact that inflation is more volatile
when the tax rule is active than when it is not. It is thus not surprising that
when such a rule is always active, it is detrimental for household welfare.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper investigates the policy implications of jointly setting monetary
and macroprudential policies when there are important financial frictions in
the economy.
11See for example Iacoviello (2005) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007).
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The first main finding is that with both a nominal and a financial frictions, a
social planner needs two separate choice variables to replicate the first-best
outcome. With two policy variables – a monetary and a financial one – the
constrained optimum is efficient. When the Ramsey planner can only set the
inflation rate, he cannot fully stabilise the economy but a policy trade-off
between stabilising inflation and output gap remains.
This result suggests that there could be a need for two distinct policies also
when the Ramsey policy solution is not available. Different policy regimes
with simple rules are analysed: one with no macroprudential policy; one with
a single monetary instrument which also reacts to financial developments;
and two regimes with separate monetary and macroprudential instruments.
The second important finding is that a policy regime where the monetary au-
thority adjusts the nominal interest rate also in reaction to real asset prices,
besides inflation and output gap, performs well in this model economy. This
suggests that a unified mandate, whereby monetary policy pays attention to
financial developments, could be useful. Especially when shocks other than
financial ones – such as technology or demand shocks – are the main drivers
of business cycles, it is seems that conventional interest-rate-based monetary
policy is enough to deal with cyclical fluctuations, if the monetary authority
reacts to financial market conditions.
However, if there are important fluctuations arising from financial shocks,
the availability of a separate macroprudential tool enhances the effectiveness
of policy in stabilising the economy. The policy supporting credit intermedi-
ation can remove inflationary pressures and leave the monetary policy to deal
with inflation. The specific policy needs to be designed carefully to avoid
conflicts with monetary policy; controlling the price instead of the quantity
of banks’ investment opportunities could be preferrable.
Finally, the analysis reveals that the sector of origin and the cause of cyclical
fluctuations in the economy matter a great deal for the appropriate policy
mix to be used. This suggests that there are considerable gains from properly
coordinating the use of macroprudential policy with conventional monetary
policy.
The limitations of the present framework relate to the fact that it is a repre-
sentative agent model without default. Thus, the “stability” of the financial
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system has to be interpreted as the credit conditions implied by the agency
problem. A macroprudential policy should, in this context, be understood
as one that seeks to minimise the agency costs in credit intermediation to
guarantee that investments reach their efficient level.
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Figure 7: Effects of a one percent negative total factor productivity shock in
the RBC model under the Ramsey policy. “Flexible price RBC”: model with
fully flexible prices and no financial friction. “Constrained-optimal RBC”:
model with fully flexible prices, but with the financial friction; policy inter-
vention by the planner.
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Figure 8: Effects of a one percent negative demand (preference) shock in the
New Keynesian model under Ramsey policy. “Inflation choice”: model with
sticky prices and the financial friction; social planner sets the inflation rate.
“Inflation and investment choice”: model with sticky prices and the financial
friction; social planner sets the inflation rate and the level of investments.
“Flexible price RBC”: the frictionless flexible price (first-best) benchmark.
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Figure 9: Policy response to a one percent adverse demand (preference) shock
under rule-based policies. “Taylor rule”: the financial frictions model with
standard Taylor rule that reacts to inflation and output gap; “Augmented
Taylor rule”: the financial frictions model with an augmented Taylor rule
that reacts to inflation, otuput gap and real capital price; ”Leverage tax”:
the financial frictions model with standard Taylor rule and leverage tax;
“Investment tax”: the financial frictions model with standard Taylor rule
and investment subsidy. “Tax/subsidy” panel: a positive figure indicates a
tax, a negative figure a subsidy.
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B Summary of the model
B.1 The dynamic equilibrium conditions
This section summarises the dynamic model equations.
B.1.1 The macro block
The household’s optimality conditions are:
wt =
χLθt
UC(Ct, Lt)
(Labour supply)
1 = βEt
[
UC(Ct+1, Lt+1)
UC(Ct, Lt)
1 + rt
pit+1
]
(Bond Euler eq.)
qt = βEt
[
UC(Ct+1, Lt+1)
UC(Ct, Lt)
(rKt+1 + (1− δ)qt+1)
]
(Capital Euler eq.)
where UC(Ct, Lt) = Zct
[
1
1−b(Ct − bCt−1)
]−σ
and logZct = φc logZct−1 + ct ,
ct ∼ N(0, σ2c ), i.i.d.
The symmetric equilibrium conditions of the intermediate production sector
are:
rKt
wt
=
αLt(j)
(1− α)Kt(j) (Relative factor price)
ψt =
(
rKt
α
)α(
wt
1− α
)(1−α)
Z−1t (Real marginal cost)
P ∗t
Pt
=
ε
ε− 1
Et
∑∞
k=0 ω
kQt,t+k ψt+k|t Yt+k|t piε+1t+k
Et
∑∞
k=0 ω
kQt,t+k Yt+k|t piεt+k
(Optimal pricing)
where Qt,t+k ≡ βk UC(Ct+1,Lt+1)UC(Ct,Lt)
Pt
Pt+k
and logZt = φ logZt−1 + t, t ∼
N(0, σ2), i.i.d.
Furthermore, the numerator of the optimal pricing decision can be reformu-
lated recursively as:
Numt = ψtYt + ω(1 + rt)−1Et piε+1t+1 Numt+1,
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and the denominator as:
Denomt = Yt + ω(1 + rt)−1Et piεt+1 Denomt+1,
which allows expressing the optimal price relative to the aggregate price level
recursively (for computational convenience) as:
P ∗t
Pt
=
ε
ε− 1
Numt
Denomt
.
The aggregate dynamic equilibrium conditions are:
Yt = ZtK
α
t (Lt)
1−α (Aggregate production)
Yt = (Ct + It)st (Aggregate consistency constraint)
st = (1− ω)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−ε
+ ωpiεt st−1 (Correction for price dispersion)
Kt+1 = pHRIt + (1− δ)Kt (Capital accumulation)
Pt =
[
ωP 1−εt−1 + (1− ω)(P ∗t )1−ε
] 1
1−ε (Aggregate price level)
1 = ωpiε−1t + (1− ω)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)1−ε
(Price dispersion)
B.1.2 The financial block
The aggregate equilibrium in the financial sector is described by the following
equations.
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κ∗t =
γρt
1 + pH∆p
(
1
1+rt
− 11+rat
) (Optimal monitoring)
b(κ∗t ) = Γ(κ
∗
t )
− γ
1−γ (Private benefit)
ρt =
qtpHR
1 + rt
− 1 (Net pledgeable income)
gt =
pH
∆p
b(κ∗t )
1 + rt
− (1− γ)ρt (Entrepreneur’s inverse leverage ratio)
Ret =
b(κ∗t )
qt∆p
(Entrepreneur’s return share)
Rbt =
κ∗t
qt∆p
(Banker’s return share)
Rwt = R−Ret −Rbt (Worker’s return share)
1 + rat =
pH
∆p
κ∗t
It
At
(Return on bank capital)
1 + ret =
pH
∆p
b(κ∗t )
It
Nt
(Return on entrepreneurial capital)
It =
Nt
gt
(Investment size)
Nt+1 = λ
e(1 + ret )
rKt+1 + (1− δ)qt+1
qt
Nt
(Accumulation of entrepreneur’s net worth)
At+1 = Z
b
tλ
b(1 + rat )
rKt+1 + (1− δt)qt+1
qt
At
(Accumulation of banker’s net worth)
where logZbt = φb logZbt−1 + bt , bt ∼ N(0, σ2b ), i.i.d.
B.1.3 Government policy
Finally, the model is closed by the Taylor rule for the nominal interest rate,
and the rule for the macroprudential policy.
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1 + rt =
1
β
piφpit x˜
φx
t q
φq
t (Taylor rule)
1 + τt = Υ˜t
φΥ (Leverage tax rule)
1 + ςt =
[
1 + rt + γ
−1κ∗t
(
1 + rt +
pH
∆p
(
1− 1 + rt
1 + rat
))]
(pHR)
−1
(Investment subsidy)
Here, x˜t ≡ YtY et is the output gap and Υ˜t ≡
(It−Nt)/Yt
(I−N)/Y is the deviation of the
loans-to-output ratio from its steady state value, or the “credit gap”.
B.2 Deterministic steady state
The deterministic steady state of the model is as follows. It is assumed that
a steady state employment subsidy is in place such that µ = 1, so that the
steady state is not distorted by the monopolistic competition.
B.2.1 The macro block
The steady state of the macro block of the model is:
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1 + r =
1
β
P ∗ = P = 1
pi = 1
s = 1
ψ = 1
q =
1 + ρ
βpHR
rK = q(r + δ)
w = (1− α)
(
rK
α
) α
α−1
K =
(rK
α
) θ+α
α−1 1− α
χ
(
rK
α
− δ
pHR
)−σ 1θ+σ
L = K
(
rK
α
) 1
1−α
Y =
rKK
α
I =
δK
pHR
C = Y − I
τ = 0
Z = Zc = Zb = 1
The steady state is non-distorted and identical to the efficient steady state
(where prices are assumed flexible and there is no financial friction in in-
vestment) when q = 1. The efficient steady state can thus be replicated by
imposing a steady state investment subsidy on the gross return of the invest-
ment project, R. Denote this subsidy by 1 + ς. Then, the subsidy needed to
replicate the efficient steady state is:
q =
1 + ρ
βpHR(1 + ς)
= 1 ⇔ ς = 1
β
− 1 + ρ
β
= r +
ρ
1 + r
.
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B.2.2 The financial block
The steady state of the financial block of the model is:
1 + ra =
β
λb
1 + re =
β
λe
Rb =
c∗
q∆p
Re =
b(c∗)
q∆p
Rw = R−Re −Rb
c∗ =
(
Γ
γ
1− γ
)1−γ ( β − λeβ
β − λbβ + ∆ppH
)1−γ
b(c∗) = Γ(c∗)−
γ
1−γ
ρ =
c∗
γ
[
1 +
pH
∆p
(
β − λ
b
β
)]
g = β
pH
∆p
b(c∗)− (1− γ)ρ
A =
λb
β
pH
∆p
c∗I
N =
λe
β
pH
∆p
b∗I
C The Ramsey problem
The problem of the Ramsey planner can be formulated as follows. Let yt
be a vector containing the n endogenous variables of the economy, includ-
ing the planner’s choice variables, and ut the vector of exogenous variables.
The agents in the economy optimise taking the planner’s choice variables
(the policy variables) as given. The equilibrium of the private economy is
described by the m first-order conditions and transition equations:
Et[f(yt−1, yt, yt+1, ut)] = 0.
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This leaves n−m choice variables for the planner.
The Ramsey planner chooses the values of the policy variables in each pe-
riod to maximise household welfare, subject to the economy’s equilibrium
conditions:
max
{yτ}∞τ=t
Eτ
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tU(Cτ , Lτ )
s.t. Eτ [f(yτ−1, yτ , yτ+1, uτ )] = 0 ∀ τ ∈ {. . . , t− 1, t, t+ 1, . . . }.
In other words, the Ramsey planner chooses a competitive equilibrium that
maximises household welfare.
D The welfare measure
The welfare cost of the different policy measures are computed as consump-
tion equivalent costs relative to a benchmark policy as described in Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2006).
Define the welfare of the household under the benchmark allocation (denoted
by R), conditional on the state of the economy at time zero, as
V R0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(CRt , L
R
t ),
where CRt and Lrt denote the plans for consumption and hours worked under
the benchmark policy regime.
Similarly, define the conditional welfare under an alternative policy plan
(denoted by A) as
V A0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(CAt , L
A
t ).
Assume that at time zero, all variables are equal to their steady-state values.
Since the steady state of the model is undistorted and unaffected by the
different policy regimes, the initial state of the economy is the same for the
benchmark and the alternative policies.
Next, denote by x the consumption-equivalent conditional welfare cost of the
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alternative policy regime, relative to the benchmark regime. Formally, the
cost x is implicitly defined by:
V A0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU((1− x)CRt , LRt ).
Using the CES functional form for periodic utility and solving for x yields:
V A0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
Zct
((1− x)CRt )1−σ
1− σ −
χ(LRt )
1+θ
1 + θ
]
= E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
((1− x)1−σ − 1)Zct
(CRt )
1−σ
1− σ
]
+ V R0
⇔ x = 1−
1 + V A0 − V R0
E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tZct
(CRt )
1−σ
1−σ
 11−σ .
Note that when V A0 = V R0 , the measure equals zero.
Simulating the models for a long enough time horizon T and repeating the
simulation N times, for N large enough, yields an estimate of the conditional
expectations V R0 and V A0 , which allows to numerically estimate the cost x.
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